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Abstract. The proliferation of occasionally Internet connectivity and accessibil-
ity has been accompanied by an increase in cyber-threats, including fraudulent 
communications. Fake computer updates, which attempt to persuade people to 
download malicious software by mimicking trusted brands and/or instilling ur-
gency, are one way in which fraudsters try to infiltrate systems. A recent study of 
young university students (M 18.52-years) found that when such pop-ups inter-
rupt a demanding cognitive task, participants spent little time viewing them and 
were more likely to miss suspicious cues and accept these updates compared to 
when they were viewed without the pressure to resume a suspended task [1]. The 
aim of the current experiment was to test an older adult sample (N = 29, all >60 
years) using the same paradigm. We predicted that they would be more suscepti-
ble to malevolent pop-ups [2]; trusting them more than younger adults (e.g., [3]), 
and would attempt to resume the interrupted task faster to limit forgetting of en-
coded items. Phase 1 involved serial recall memory trials interrupted by genuine, 
mimicked, and low authority pop-ups. During phase 2, participants rated mes-
sages with unlimited time and gave reasons for their decisions. It was found that 
more than 70% of mimicked and low authority pop-ups were accepted in Phase 
1 vs ~80% genuine pop-ups (and these were all approximately 10% higher than 
[1]). This was likely due to a greater tendency to ignore or miss suspicious con-
tent when performing under pressure, despite spending longer with messages and 
reporting high awareness of scam techniques than younger adults. Older adult 
participants were more suspicious during Phase 2 performing comparably to the 
younger adults in [1]. Factors that may impact older adult decisions relating to 
fraudulent computer communications are discussed, as well as theoretical and 
practical implications. 
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1 Introduction 
The number of older adults using computers and the Internet for communication and 
entertainment is increasing [4, 5]. A recent report by the Office for National Statistics 
[5] revealed that 89% of UK adults used the Internet between January and March 2017 
compared with 88% in 2016 (ONS, 2017). Forty-one percent of the 2017 Internet users 
were aged above 75-years and 78% were aged between 65-74-years, compared with 
52% for the same demographic in 2011. Thus, within the UK at least, it is clear that use 
of the Internet is increasing amongst older adults. 
Whilst the rapid proliferation of Internet connectivity and accessibility is associated 
with multiple benefits to both younger and older users, there have been alarming in-
creases in cyber-threats across both population sectors. For example, a recent report 
highlighted that up to 45% of consumers have been the victim of cyber-crime [6]. 
Online fraud and scams are a growing problem across society, with the general public 
increasingly exposed to fake websites, emails and computer updates [7]. These com-
munications attempt to persuade people to click on malicious links, unknowingly down-
load malware or provide personal information, often by masquerading as established 
institutions or brands and creating urgent scenarios designed to instill a sense of panic 
in recipients [8,9]. In addition to the potential financial and psychological costs of be-
coming a victim of fraud [10], such fake communications have the potential to signifi-
cantly disrupt consumer trust and engagement in online activities and e-commerce [11]. 
Understanding what makes people susceptible to responding to fraudulent communica-
tions is, therefore, vital in order to identify how susceptibility can be effectively re-
duced. This is not only key to inform behavior change interventions and interface de-
sign recommendations for those accessing the Internet for work purposes, but also for 
individuals, including older adults, who are increasingly using the Internet for purposes 
such as socializing, purchasing, and banking.  
Older adults have traditionally been considered to be particularly at risk of fraud vic-
timization [12]. This has been linked with situational factors, such as greater social 
isolation [13]. However, research has suggested that cognitive mechanisms related to 
trust evaluations may also impact vulnerability, with older adults being more trusting 
of stimuli that contain cues that provoke a higher degree of suspicion in younger adults; 
a finding reflected in differential neural activation [3]. Truth Default Theory [14] sug-
gests that when evaluating communications, individuals default to considering commu-
nications to be trustworthy unless cues are identified that provoke suspicion. Thus, it is 
possible that in older adult populations, subtle suspicious cues within fraudulent com-
munications may be less likely to trigger an evaluation away from the cognitive default 
of trusting information to be legitimate. Older adults have also been found to be more 
likely to report succumbing to Internet phishing scams than younger adults, with prior 
victimization not predicted by differences in executive functioning ability [2]. How-
ever, a recent study did not fully support these findings [15].  
It could be that susceptibility to phishing is in part determined by the setting. For 
example, when reviewing a pop-up as a single task, older adults may accurately identify 
malicious intent. However, in a situation where a task is already in progress, being in-
terrupted by a pop-up may in-crease susceptibly to scams as these situations would in-
crease cognitive load and tap into executive functions, which have been found to de-
cline with age [16]. Indeed, studies have found that older adults show higher global cost 
  
in terms of task switching, that they perform less well in tasks of di-vided attention, and 
that their selective attention is particularly negatively affected by interference in chal-
lenging situations [17, 18]. Older adults perform less well in tasks of divided attention 
[18], and their selective attention is worse when faced with more challenging situations 
as they can be more proneness to interference effects [17]. Furthermore, older adults 
have also been shown to have greater difficulties in keeping track of multiple streams 
of information and this may manifest in prioritizing one stream and neglecting another 
[19, 20]. There is also evidence that older adults tend to focus on one task more and 
neglect the other [20]. Taken together, these findings would suggest that situations with 
a high cognitive load may lead to less advantageous decision making in older adults.  
In their consideration of susceptibility to phishing emails within the general public, 
[21, 22] suggest that whether suspicious cues are noticed within fraudulent communi-
cations depends on the depth of processing that an individual engages in. Individuals 
who engage in more automatic, heuristic forms of processing are considered to be more 
vulnerable to the influence techniques used within these messages (e.g., urgency, com-
pliance with authority, avoidance of loss) and neglect other, more suspicious, aspects 
of the communication, such as authenticity cues (e.g., accurate sender addresses). These 
are core parameters of the recently developed Suspicion, Cognition, Automaticity 
Model (SCAM: [22]). It is possible that any increased trust of such communications in 
older adults, therefore, may be due to a greater reliance on heuristic processing strate-
gies that prioritize influence cues when making decisions. Although it should be noted 
that reliance on less cognitively demanding strategies amongst some older adults’ may 
not always be negative, depending on the task, goal, and context; including time con-
straints [23].  
A recent study by [1] considered these theoretically driven mechanisms in relation to 
judgements of fraudulent computer updates, using a task interruption paradigm to ex-
amine the effects of cognitive pressure on decision processes amongst university stu-
dents (M age 18.56-years). They compared three message types differing in authority 
based upon the presence and/or accuracy of informational cues (e.g., spelling error, 
inaccurate website link, lacking a copyright symbol). Genuine authority messages were 
not affected by any of these issues, whereas mimicked authority messages contained all 
three cues to potential malevolence. Low authority messages, contained no sender de-
tails, no reference to the application that seemingly required updating, and no website 
link. When younger adults were interrupted by such messages, whereby their ability to 
engage in more considered, systematic processing of message content is reduced, they 
were more likely to miss suspicious elements, assuming that messages were genuine. 
This led to accepting almost as many mimicked as genuine authority messages and an 
alarming 56% of low authority messages. This might have been partly driven by the 
short amount of time participants took before making a response. This was approxi-
mately 5.5-seconds for both genuine and mimicked messages and only slightly higher 
for low authority messages (~6-seconds). As expected, serial recall memory was im-
paired in all conditions irrespective of message authority, although was markedly worse 
following low versus genuine authority messages. In a follow-up phase, where partici-
pants viewed messages in isolation under no time pressure, the percentage of low au-
thority message accepts reduced to 27% and whilst there was an improvement for mim-
icked messages, 55% were still accepted.  
  
The extent that the above findings apply to other population sectors, such as older 
adults, is currently unknown. For instance, are older adults more vulnerable to heuristic 
processes that scams rely on and therefore less likely to notice suspicious elements? Or, 
similar to younger adults, does this depend on the degree of cognitive resource that 
individuals have available to process information at the time and/or the amount of time 
they allocate to make a decision when needing to return to a suspended task? These are 
issues that we attempt to address within the current study as understanding them is vital 
to ensure that effective mitigations and interventions can be developed that enable all 
consumers to safely engage with online activities. 
 
The Current Study 
The paradigm used by [1] is applied to an older adult population. Specifically, partici-
pants complete a demanding serial recall task and are interrupted during this task by 
computer updates of varying legitimacy purporting to require urgent action. They must 
respond to these interruptions before being able to continue with the serial recall task. 
Participants then respond to the same update messages during a questionnaire phase, 
where there are no additional cognitive demands. This allows for a comparison of re-
sponse judgements when recipients are under differing degrees of cognitive pressure. 
As in [1], participants within the current study are also asked to elaborate reasons for 
their accept/decline decisions within the questionnaire phase.   
 
Main Hypotheses 
According to previous research, the presence of urgency and loss influence techniques 
within computer update messages, combined with the pressure of continuing a sus-
pended cognitively demanding primary task, should lead to participants failing to notice 
inconsistencies within messages and defaulting to a trusting stance [1, 14, 21, 22]. 
When under less cognitive pressure, inconsistencies are more likely to be noticed and 
illegitimate messages declined. Thus the following hypotheses can be made: 
 
If increased cognitive pressure makes older adults more susceptible to fraudulent mes-
sages due to a reliance on heuristic processing strategies, it is predicted that: 
H1a) There will be no difference in response choice between genuine and mimicked or 
low authority messages during the serial recall task, due to a failure to identify incon-
sistencies in message content. Specifically, the proportion of ‘message accepts’ will be 
the same in all conditions.  
H1b) Conversely, when participants have unlimited time to inspect the content of mes-
sages, mimicked and low authority messages will be declined significantly more than 
genuine messages, due to the identification of inconsistencies provoking suspicion re-
garding message legitimacy. 
H1c) There will be no difference in serial recall performance between genuine and 
mimicked or low authority message interruption conditions, due to all messages being 
processed to an equal extent (i.e., heuristically) and therefore having an equal impact 
on primary task resumption. Though, and related to H1a, post-interruption serial recall 
performance per se will be higher than in [1] because older adults will spend less time 
viewing all message types than the younger adults in [1] in order to resume the inter-
rupted task promptly to limit the degree of forgetting of previously encoded items. 
 
  
2 Method 
Participants. Twenty-nine participants from a Bristol UK-based group database of 
self-reported, community dwelling healthy older adults (aged 60+) were recruited to 
participate in an experiment advertised as a multitasking study. The experiment was 
one of a battery of studies (counterbalanced) conducted as part of a BRACE 2017-18 
funded project (see Acknowledgements). Sixty-one participants completed the entire 
battery, and nine were excluded due to Montreal Cognitive Assessment [24] scores <26. 
Mean age was 68.73-years (SD = 4.42); and approximately 2/3 were female. Exclusion 
criteria included a medical history of neurological or neuropsychiatric diagnosis or 
other medical issue (e.g., brain injury, substance abuse, visual/auditory deficits) that 
could impede or prevent the ability to complete the battery of tests. 
Design. A repeated-measures design was adopted, whereby all participants completed 
the same computer task (phase 1) and post-task questionnaires (phase 2). Phase 1 in-
cluded 27 serial recall memory (SRM) trials, with nine interrupted by pre-designed 
computer updates that required an ‘accept’ or ‘decline’ response. Messages were one 
of three types: genuine authority, mimicked authority, or low authority (see Fig 1 for 
examples), and there were three instances of each. Further details are provided below. 
Dependent variables included the number of to-be-remembered (TBR) items recalled 
in the correct serial order (Max. nine per trial) and the proportion of genuine, mimicked 
and low authority interrupting messages accepted (Max. three per condition). 
  
Materials and Procedure. These largely followed [1]. Phase 1 involved participants 
completing 27 SRM trials whilst being periodically, although not continuously, inter-
rupted by computer update pop-up messages. For each trial, participants were presented 
with a string of nine letters and numbers in the center of the screen for 9-seconds. This 
letter/number string then disappeared and following a 2-second retention interval was 
replaced with the words ‘enter code’ for 10-seonds. At this point participants were re-
quired to record as many numbers and letters that they could remember in the correct 
order. Each trial used a different number/letter string. Nine trials contained an interrup-
tion, consisting of system security-related update pop-up messages appearing in the 
center of the screen after the letter/number string had disappeared but before the in-
struction to start recalling the string. This message remained on the screen until the 
participant chose to either accept it by pressing corresponding keys on the keyboard. 
Only after participants had responded could they continue with the suspended SRM 
trial. 
Computer update messages were the same as those used in [1], see Figure 1. This 
included three genuine authority update messages (i.e., contained specific details re-
lated to recognizable organizations or software manufacturers, such as accurate com-
puter programme references, presence of a copyright symbol and genuine website 
links), three mimicked authority update messages (i.e., contained the same level of de-
tail but included a spelling error, an inaccurate website link and lacked a copyright 
symbol) and three low authority update messages (i.e., contained no details relating to 
the sender of the communication, such as organization’s or application’s, and no web-
site link). All of these updates required an urgent response to counter a purported threat, 
and focused on e.g., anti-virus, program critical fixes, or expiry of licenses. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1. Example genuine (top), mimicked (middle) and low (bottom) authority interrupting pop-
up messages. 
In phase 2, participants completed a computer-based questionnaire where they had 
unlimited time to re-evaluate each of the nine messages and indicate whether they 
would ordinarily accept or decline them. Qualitative data was also collected by asking 
participants to explain each rating decision. Finally, participants were asked a series of 
7-point Likert-scale questions related to cyber security awareness, which included: ‘To 
what extent do you trust communications from your computer system, such as security 
updates, in general?’; ‘How confident are you in your ability to differentiate genuine 
communications from scam communications in daily life?’ and ‘How would you rate 
your awareness of the common techniques used in scams?’ In total, phase 2 took ap-
proximately 10 minutes. Participants were fully debriefed and given information on 
how to be more vigilant when dealing with online pop-up messages. 
3 Results and Discussion 
Scam Awareness, Trust, and Computer Usage 
Participants reported a relatively high level of awareness of techniques used by scam-
mers (M = 5.07; SD = 1.56; Range 1-7), although self-reported confidence to identify a 
scam (M = 4.21; SD = 1.82; Range 1-6) and trust in computer communications (M = 
4.52; SD = 1.72; Range 1-7) were rated lower. They also reported spending on average 
5.03-hours on computers a week and 4.28-hours using the Internet.  
 
Impact of Message Authority and Cognitive Complexity on Judgements 
  
The number of messages accepted during phase 1 SRM trials and the questionnaire 
phase 2 are shown in Table 1 (and compared with [1]). A 2 (phase: serial recall, ques-
tionnaire) x 3 (message authority: genuine, mimicked, low) factorial repeated measures 
analysis of variance (ANOVA) revealed a significant main effect of phase, F(1, 28) = 
22.57, MSE = 1.55, p < .001, with messages more likely to be accepted in phase 1 than 
2. A significant main effect of message authority was also found, F(2, 27) = 10.05, MSE 
= .335, p = .001, as well as a significant interaction, F(2, 27) = 9.01, MSE = .205, p = 
.001. Bonferroni post-hoc comparisons revealed that during the SRM phase, partici-
pants were more likely to accept genuine than mimicked authority messages (M Diff = 
.31, p = .005, CI = .104, .516), in partial contrast to H1a. However, there were no sig-
nificant differences in accept behavior across mimicked and low authority messages, 
or, low and genuine authority messages (all ps > .2), in line with H1a. Conversely, in 
the questionnaire phase, significant differences were found between all message types, 
with participants more likely to accept genuine messages than both mimicked (M Diff 
= .414, p = .02, CI = .069, .759) and low authority (M Diff = .759, p < .001, CI = .460, 
1.058), and also mimicked than low authority messages (M Diff = .345, p = .016, CI = 
.071, .619), supporting H1b. 
 
Table 1. Mean number of messages accepted per authority condition (Max. 3) when presented 
during the SRM and questionnaire phases. Note. Compared to findings of [1]. 
Message  
Authority 
Current Study 
Phase 1 
Williams et al. 
(2017) Phase 1 
Current Study 
Phase 2 
Williams et al. 
(2017) Phase 2 
 M SD M SD M SD M SD 
Low 2.34 .97 1.68 1.25 1.07 1.10 0.82 0.95 
Mimicked 2.17 1.14 1.89 1.23 1.41 1.09 1.65 1.04 
Genuine  2.48 .91 1.98 1.25 1.83 1.17 2.15 0.92 
 
Impact of Pop-Up Message Interruptions Varying in Authority on Serial Recall 
Memory Performance 
Serial recall memory performance was considered for all four conditions (no interrup-
tion, low authority interruption, mimicked authority interruption, and genuine authority 
interruption), see Figure 1. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant main 
effect of interruption authority, F(3,84) = 6.723, MSE = 1.03, p < .001, with higher 
SRM performance in the no interruption condition compared to all interruption condi-
tions (ps < .02). However, there were no significant differences in SRM performance 
between any of the pop-up message conditions (all ps > .1), supporting hypothesis H1c. 
This potential lack of processing differences between malevolent and genuine pop-up 
messages was further supported by findings of another repeated measures ANOVA, 
with a Huynh-Feldt correction applied due to violation of sphericity, which revealed no 
significant difference in participant response times (i.e., to select ‘accept’ or ‘decline’) 
across message type, F(1.44, 40.32) = 4.09, MSE = 8.96, p = .60: M genuine response 
time = 10.45s; M mimicked response time = 10.92s; M low response time = 11.00s. 
Interestingly, all mean response times were approximately 5 seconds longer than in the 
younger adult sample of [1], yet SRM performance post-interruption was very compa-
rable to that study (noting a marginally significant performance decline following low 
vs genuine authority interruptions in [1]).  
 
  
 
Fig 1. Effect of interrupt message type on serial recall memory. Note. Error bars represent 
±standard error.   
 
In combination, the findings suggest that when operating under a higher degree of 
cognitive pressure, older adult participants may have relied on more heuristic pro-
cessing strategies linked to an inherent truth bias. However, participants did spend con-
siderable time (relative to younger adults in [1]) with the messages onscreen before 
responding, which may have aided identification of inconsistencies for mimicked au-
thority messages, and resulted in these being more likely to provoke suspicion [14, 22]. 
Conversely, low authority messages did not provoke suspicion when participants were 
operating under cognitive load, with such messages failing to contain overt information 
that could be used to trigger suspicion processes [14]. This failure to identify subtler 
triggers of suspicion during the serial recall task could be linked to previous suggestions 
of diminished ‘gut responses’ to suspicious cues in older adults [3], resulting in a con-
tinued default to considering the message to be legitimate.  
When participants had more cognitive resource available (phase 2), however, they 
were better able to differentiate between fraudulent and genuine messages, with low 
authority messages considered to be the most suspicious (being accepted only 36% of 
the time) followed by mimicked authority messages (accepted 47% of the time). It 
should however be considered that participants were also more suspicious of genuine 
authority messages in this condition (accepted 61% of the time compared to 83% of the 
time in the serial recall condition), thus showing a reduced truth bias overall when more 
systematic processing of message content was encouraged. 
 
Why Participants Chose to Accept or Decline Pop-Up Messages 
Open-ended responses regarding why participants chose to accept or decline particular 
updates were analyzed using thematic analysis. The most common themes reported as 
impacting decision-making reflected those identified in the young adult sample of [1], 
and included: 
• Reference to the influence techniques contained within the computer update messages, 
such as relating to known programs and/or respected organizations (e.g., “[] runs my 
computer programs so I trust them”), perceiving the action as urgent and important to 
  
undertake immediately (“Anything that mentions online security and stability immedi-
ately causes worry for me”) or avoiding some form of security threat or other negative 
impact of some form of functionality (e.g., “important that the computer is protected”) 
• Reference to potential authenticity cues, such as spelling errors or inconsistencies, in 
raising suspicion (e.g., “Spelling mistake in [] suggests non-genuine source” and “No 
source quoted”) or in appearing legitimate (e.g., “The link verifies that it can be verified 
as genuine”). Alternatively, this could relate to more subjective judgements, such as a 
communication either ‘looking genuine’ (e.g., “Source of message looks convincing” 
and “Seems genuine”) or appearing to be ‘not right’ in some way (e.g., “Suspicious that 
this is a fake message and that accept will result in malware” and “Don’t trust mes-
sage”), with precise reasons for this not given.  
• Reference to either technical knowledge (e.g., “I prefer my own security measures to 
[]’s”) or an awareness of potential risks of online fraud (e.g., “Anyone can call them-
selves []” and “It may not be what it claims; perhaps a scam”). This awareness was also 
reflected in the use of alternative verification strategies, whereby further verification or 
support would be sought if lacking technical knowledge (e.g., “Would check with the 
university IT Dept”, “Unsure, so would ask husband”, “I would have confirmed before-
hand after getting support from the link” and “ask expert”).  
• Reference to routine behaviors, such as always declining certain types of update (e.g., 
“Wouldn’t accept anything as their security software screens everything” and “I would 
never accept a clean process from a pop-up”). 
4 Limitations 
There are a number of limitations that warrant noting and future attention. First, the 
sample size (N = 29) was much lower than in [1] (N = 87). Whilst this would normally 
be respectable given the independent variables tested and withstanding adequate power 
to detect medium to large effect sizes (f = .25-.4, [25]), there might possibly be greater 
cognitive ability differences within the older adult sample in relation to processes such 
as short-term memory and attention-inhibition. These factors have been measured as 
part of the larger study although have not yet been analyzed in relation to the current 
findings. For example, it could be the case that older adults with a higher verbal working 
memory span would feel less pressured to resume the primary task faster (and also re-
spond to a pop-up message faster) than individuals with a lower span. Second, we noted 
early on that typically fewer (~41-78%) participants in our tested age range reported 
regularly using the Internet compared to the ~99% of younger adults identified in pre-
vious work [5]. Thus older adults might be less familiar with Internet pop-ups than 
younger adults. This may have impacted the findings and in future should be considered 
as a possible co-variate. Third, and related to the last point, it may be the case that a 
greater number of older adults are less familiar with the brand and company names used 
within genuine and mimicked messages (e.g. Adobe Flash Player, AVG Internet Secu-
rity, Microsoft Visual Basic). Whilst this does not seem to be able to account for the 
differences between accept rates for genuine versus mimicked authority messages (i.e., 
should be similar if brand/company familiarity was an issue), familiarity is a factor that 
should be controlled for in future studies. Fourth, participants were not using personal 
  
computers and instead used university computers under controlled laboratory condi-
tions. This could mean that the perceived consequences of accepting more messages, 
despite their authority, was not deemed critical to the participants (i.e., ‘what is the 
worst that can happen?’). Additionally, many may have perceived the university labor-
atory to be a safe and secure environment and felt that the computers would be protected 
against possible cyber threats and/or equipped to deal with any that get through. Either 
way, this means that the findings need to be treated with a degree of caution in terms of 
possible generalizability to personal computer usage situations. Fifth, our sample were 
predominantly high functioning and mostly well educated, and so perhaps atypical of a 
less self-selecting sample. This could have been linked with them being more aware of 
online safety issues. Finally, whilst we can assume that older adult participants were 
engaging in greater visual and possibly heuristic processing of pop-up messages during 
the 10-11-seconds taken to make a response compared with the younger participants in 
[1] (who responded ~5-seconds faster), both studies are lacking eye movement, fixa-
tion, and pupilometry (e.g., pupil size variations) data. This is a factor that requires 
attention in future studies if firm conclusions are to be made about what participants 
are processing, when, for how long, and to what depth.  
5 Implications 
There are a number of implications of the current study findings that warrant future 
attention. A key and alarming finding is that despite our older adult sample accepting 
fewer mimicked than genuine authority messages under conditions of high cognitive 
(specifically memory) load, 72% of all mimicked authority messages were accepted 
when 100% should have been declined if cues to potential deception were detected and 
acted upon. Worse still, 78% of low authority messages (containing no sender details, 
application details, website links or other cues to authenticity, such as copyright sym-
bols) were accepted. Like younger adults [1], albeit to a greater extent, older adults 
seem to demonstrate a very high degree of susceptibility to potentially malevolent 
online pop-up messages masquerading as innocent and important computer update mes-
sages. Thus, at least two implications follow. First, older (and younger) adults seem to 
require better training into techniques and strategies for determining the legitimacy of 
computer-based communications such as pop-up alerts. Such interventions could in-
volve training to detect cues to potential malevolence and allowing a sufficient amount 
of practice delegated to learn the procedure(s). 
However, the scenarios we have tested involve responding to pop-up messages whilst 
a high cognitive load memory based task has been suspended. So benefits of such train-
ing may be minimal if people are determined to deal with pop-ups promptly and return 
to the primary task. One idea is to train individuals to decline pop-up type messages 
when they occur under such cognitively taxing circumstances to minimize the risk of 
making a costly mistake. However, this will not always be possible (e.g., in safety- 
and/or time- critical situations) and may result in compromising the smooth and effi-
cient running of the computer and its applications. Therefore, and second, we advocate 
the development of interface design features that on one hand should support users to 
dedicate more cognitive effort to checking the integrity of update type messages (e.g., 
  
offer informative feedback, permit easy reversal of actions: e.g., [26]) whilst not com-
promising the performance of a primary task (e.g., include flexible time periods to re-
inspect and respond to messages, user control and freedom with clearly marked exits 
such as a ‘not now’ option: e.g., [27]). In the case of older adults, there are a range of 
relevant interface design principles (e.g., [28, 29, 30]), including: avoid complex or 
long messages to avoid memory/information overload; clearly label items (especially 
those that are complex); use simple, minimal and intuitive steps in order to perform 
tasks; and, avoid using time pressure (e.g., perform x in 10-seconds, choose ‘yes’ or 
‘no’). Each of these and numerous other interface design recommendations, together 
with better training into techniques and strategies for determining the legitimacy of 
computer-based communications need careful consideration in the future to minimize 
susceptibility to potentially malevolent online threats amongst both younger and per-
haps more crucially older adult Internet user populations. 
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